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TOWARDS A COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR DEFENSE STUDIES.

by

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Introduction

The field of international relations today is character-
ized by a trend toward fragmentation in the pursuit of theory.
A strong case can be made for the statement that the system-
atic study of international relations is a young discipline
dating approximately from the pre-WW II period. And yet, a
definite cycle in the methods of research has manifested
itself during this short period. The initial literature was
historical-descriptive in nature dealing largely with
isolated topics. Conclusions tended to be tentative and
generally applicable only within the parameters of the
specific study at hand. In the early 1950's a scientific
trend developed based on methodical research techniques
which aimed at producing a general theory of international
relations. Once the constraints on this goal became apparent,
scholars aimed at producing smaller scale theories which they
hoped in time might be linked together to form a general
theory.

This theoretical trend in international relations was
paralleled by a similar trend in other social science
disciplines such as sociology, anthropology and psychology.
The recognition that work being done in these parallel fields
might have significant import for the field of international
relations has resulted in a renewed fragmentation in the
search for theory in international relations. The work done
in these parallel fields highlighted the importance of new
variables for the act of theory construction in international

relations which has encouraged many researchers to seek answers to international relations problems in other fields.[1]

At the present it appears that there is little cohesion in terms of the shared concepts and models that must provide the infrastructure for cumulative scientific research. This is true within the core discipline of political science that services the field of international relations as well as in the numerous social sciences and applied fields that in one way or another speak to conditions and events that have impact in more than one state.

The above described trend in the pursuit of international relations theory has had a profound effect on the cumulative impact of international relations research (the extent to which one study can build on preceding work) but of central importance for this paper on the area of public policy making. It would not be unfair to say that policy-makers have almost unanimously declared contemporary international relations research irrelevant, and it appears that many scholars are willing to accept that verdict as valid.[2]

A thesis of this paper is that the application of policy analysis concepts to the field of international relations will contain the growing fragmentation while allowing researchers to ask specific questions of individual interest. Concurrently it will provide a more viable basis for international studies education and for studies that have some relevance to the policy-makers. One major aim of this paper is to show how the concepts and frameworks developed

in the study of public policy can be transferred to the
transnational level specifically in the comparative analysis
of national security policy. A correlative goal is to
demonstrate how that transference can contribute to cumulative
international relations research in the comparative analysis
of national security policy formulation.

Generalizations from the Literature

The topic of this thesis specifically concerns the
problem of conducting meaningful, comparative studies in the
sub-field of national security policy formulation. Having
conducted a thorough survey of the existing literature
dealing with the topic of national security policy, I find
that certain generalizations concerning the present state
of affairs can be made.

A major problem inherent in the study of national security
policy formulation processes is the difficulty of obtaining
substantive information. The very nature of the subject
matter dictates that nations will closely control access to
and dissemination of information pertaining to issues of
national security interest. As a result, information which
may be critical to discovering how routine and specific
decisions are taken may not be easily available. The
availability of such information for a given country will
vary from the relatively wide spread access possible in the
United States to the practical dearth of access which
characterizes the Peoples Republic of China. The fact that

adequate information on national security issues is not readily available may not reflect a conscious desire of the particular government to suppress such information. It may reflect a general tendency within the society simply to not widely disseminate information concerning governmental operations per se.

The key point to be made here is that this aspect of the variable degree of availability of substantive information on national security issues has major implications for the development of a comparative framework. A framework which requires detailed knowledge of sensitive issues in order to be useful will probably fail in more cases than not. Any framework designed to facilitate comparison and analysis of national security policy formulation must focus not on the specific policies, but on the general procedural milieu within which policy is formulated.

A possible technique for dealing with the problem of information access is the personal interview with an individual possessing substantial knowledge of the policy formulating procedures and defense establishment of the subject country. In the case of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), as a result of an obvious desire not to magnify defense policy decisions and a conscious effort to diffuse military matters within the society, substantive information in several areas is difficult to obtain. However, having had the benefit of an interview with Herr Dr. Wilhelm Hoynck, Deputy Chief of the Mid-East/Maghreb Section of the Federal Foreign Ministry,

who has seen considerable service with NATO and the German
defense establishment, it was possible to gain valuable
insights of a more substantive nature.

Another generalization which becomes obvious from a
review of the literature, and which is of basic importance,
is that there exists a definitional problem concerning what
is precisely meant by 'policy', and an even greater
imprecision as to exactly what constitutes 'national security
policy'. There is frankly no agreement as to what is meant
by the two terms. Some authors even decline to confront the
problem of definition. The assumption that the terms are
universally understood is incorrect.

Policy

It is necessary to begin by developing suitable
definitions of these two essential terms. One concept of
policy is an operational one. Policy is an output of a
decision-making process. The predominant tendency is to
regard decision-making as a rational, prescribed, intellectual
process which proceeds according to a particular pattern:
definition of the problem, consideration of alternative
courses of action, data-gathering, and selection of the most
appropriate course of action.[3] This procedure may character-
ize some policy decision-making processes; however, it is
far from a paradigm. This characterization not only fails
to exhaust what factors determine decision, but it falsifys
what takes place on the strictly intellectual level. What

is of primary importance is the extent to which decision-making is a social process and as such is conducted in a stream of social processes. As such, a policy represents an intention or commitment to proceed in a certain manner as opposed to other possible options. This conception indicates that in weighing the worth of a particular policy, one must consider the 'value foregone' represented by the alternative course not chosen.[4]

A policy is essentially meaningless unless it is operationalized by subsequent actions of the individual, agency, or government enunciating the policy. In other words, the decision-making process which makes the selection from available options merely formulates the policy. It is the subsequent actions taken by the agency which give form and substance to the policy. For example in the special case of defense policy in the FRG, it is the announced goal of the Bonn government to prevent the remilitarization of German society and to provide the greatest personal freedom for the population consistent with public order. This goal is embedded in the Basic Law promulgated in 1949. However, this is a societal goal, or national value rather than a policy. The most recent decision of the Bundestag not to require any German citizen to bear arms in military service against his will without the requirement to obtain certified conscientious objector status, represents a policy which operationalizes the above national value.

Thus 'policy' is an action word, and the action taken

is to a great extent the policy.

National Security Policy

The term national security policy means different things to different authors. A close approximation of how the term is used in this paper is embodied in a definition found in the July/August 1977 issue of Public Administration Review. National security policy "is that part of government policy having as its objective the creation of national and international political conditions favorable to the protection or extension of vital national values against existing and potential adversaries".[5] National security policy is differentiated from foreign policy in part by the fact that the decision-making process is contained within the state whereas the conduct of foreign policy requires the inter-action of at least two nations. Thus a unique aspect is that national security policy is formulated within the state but designed to exercise its influence primarily outside the state. This definition implies correctly that national security policy inter alia is a special sub-set of the overall field of public administration. The definition also stipulates that policies which operationalize the described 'favorable conditions' are national security policies.

In an article titled "Security Policy and the Process of Detente", Wolf Graf von Baudissin, security poli advisor to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, exemplifies such relationships contained in these definitions and discussions of policy and

national security policy.

> Security policy refers to a certain category
> of measures adopted by a government to protect it
> against external interference in form of direct or
> indirect use of military force; thus, such a policy
> would safeguard a government from being forced to
> violate its own interests. The main objective of
> security policies must be to make non-war safer by
> escalating the process of stabilization. For this
> purpose the implications of alternative policies
> must be examined in terms of to what extent they
> might affect the entire range of international
> relations and the prospects for beneficial interaction.[6]

A final generalization evident in the existing literature

would concern the distinct lack of commonality in the concept-

ualization of what constitutes comparative analysis of

national security policy. Many of the studies which claim

to be comparative are not. Some consist of several case

studies at the end of which the reader must accomplish any

comparison which is to be done by organizing the information

presented according to his own mental calculus. The systematic

and intellectual examination of the processes of national

security policy formulation within a comparative model or

framework has not been achieved.

The Goal

The trend is to develop rigorous, analytical, and if

possible quantitative models in the social sciences. However,

the current state of affairs in the field of national

security policy analysis does not facilitate a quantum jump

to rigorous model building. What is needed first is a

framework to organize the essentially descriptive, deductive analysis necessary to strengthen comparison.

This thesis has two goals. First, to develop and flesh out a framework which can be used to guide research and present findings in such a way as to make meaningful comparison of national security policy formulation processes possible. A second goal, the subject of chapter two, is to conduct an in-depth analysis of the national security policy formulation process in the FRG making use of the above framework.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Edward T. Hall, The Silent Language, (New York: Anchor Books, 1973), p. 28.

[2] Raymond Tanter and Richard H. Ullman, World Politics (Supplemental edition) vol. XXIV, No. 5, Spring, 1972.

[3] R. A. Bauer, I. Pool, and Lewis A. Dexter, American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign Trade, (New York: Atherton Press, 1967), p. 479.

[4] Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, (New York: The Free Press), p. 53.

[5] Frank N. Trager and Frank L. Simonie, Public Administration Review, No. 4, July/August 1977, p. 320.

[6] Wolf Graf von Baudissin, "Security Policy and the Process of Detente", in Co-Existence An International Journal, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Special issue), 1977, p. 102.

CHAPTER I

TOWARDS A COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK

General Review of the Comparative Literature

The systematic and intellectual examination of the
processes of national security policy formulation in any
country is hampered by the lack of a rigorous model which
can be used to provide structure and system to the conduct
of research and the presentation of findings. A great
portion of the writing done in the area of national security
policy formulation tends to be randomly descriptive in
nature.

Two approaches account for the bulk of the material
available. One method, reminiscent of the earlier historical-
descriptive work, consists of a purely randomly descriptive
approach. The author may be personally concerned with the
French weapons industry or the British strategic role in
international affairs. Many books are available which
allege an integrated analysis of national security policy
in the title, but in reality are a compilation of only
topically related articles.[1] This approach encourages a
concentration of the literature around the more dramatic
issues, frequently to the detriment of more mundane but
critical issues such as organization for decision-making,
institutional considerations, and the inter-action of the
major participants comprising the defense community.

This randomly descriptive method actually discourages comparative analysis because of the asymmetry of the information available on any selected country. As a result, any conclusions arrived at or speculations on future policy are limited in validity to only the circumstances of the description. No attempt has been made to identify and organize the variables at work in the situational milieu of the described policy. Using such a method, one could write whole books on why the Germans will never develop an independent nuclear force and totally neglect the more important policy formulation process which will ultimately make that decision.

A second method, less common in the existing body of literature, which exhibits a more comprehensive and systematic approach, is the framework utilized in Comparative Defense Policy edited by Frank B. Horton III. The method in this text involves the use of six topical headings: weapons acquisition, force posture, the military profession, structure and process, military doctrine, and the use of force. This method facilitates comparative analysis by eliminating the asymmetrical nature of the available material. However, the information which is developed tends to be focused on the basically arbitrarily selected topical headings. A major critique of this method is the question of how one might know one has chosen the most meaningful topics. One could easily choose a different set of topical headings and conceivably get different conclusions. Thus, points which may be crucial to the understanding of unique

features in a particular system might not be examined utilizing this model.

An assessment of the existing literature shows that at present there does not exist a rigorous model or structural framework which can be used to provide structure and system to the conduct of research and the presentation of findings.

The general fragmentation previously described is significantly reflected in the writing which has been done concerning comparative national security policy. From time to time a great deal of attention is directed to particular policies such as foreign military sales or nuclear weapons policy. The tendency is most often to consider the policy as a distinct entity both in research of the policy and in comparison. Much of the comparative literature concerning national security policy is in reality the attempt to compare policies. There is little if any appreciation for national security policy as the outcome of a more meaningful formulation process. This is particularly curious since the scholarly community has long looked at domestic public policy as representing the outcome of an essentially political process.[2]

There is a certain element of futility in placing primary concern with policy outcomes. First it has long been recognized, as summed up by Gabriel Almond, that "the development of a science of comparative politics depends initially upon the accurate description and classification of political processes in different societies".[3] The mere comparison of policies leaves unexplained the processes responsible for

their development. For this reason, every question answered
is likely to raise a greater number of more serious
questions which cannot be answered by output analysis.

Secondly, the large number of variables involved in the
development of a policy represent a substantial source of
possible criticism for comparisons based on policy analysis.
In addition to establishing the 'accurate description and
classification of political processes in different societies'
as the initial step in the development of a science of
comparative politics, Almond and Powell also indicate
another aspect of comparative politics which has meaning for
the development of an analytical model:

> Several factors complicate the availability
> of comparative information. There is the difficulty
> of establishing definite cause-and-effect relation-
> ships in the world of politics. The number of factors
> involved in any set of political events is likely
> to be so complex that responsibility is difficult
> to assess.[4]

From a review of the literature and the knowledge of
some particular problems emanating from the nature of the
subject matter, some basic comments are possible concerning
the nature of a useful comparative framework. For several
reasons, it has been established that substantive information
on national security issues may be hard to gather. Thus
a comparative framework should not require the obtaining
of sensitive information nor be so specific and detailed
that its application will be affected by this aspect of
the subject. Because of the relationship of policy to

process, the framework should stress comparison of formulation processes while taking into consideration the important outputs (policies) of the process.

Great difficulty may be anticipated in attempting to establish cause-and-effect relationships in this area of public policy. For these reasons the term comparative framework is preferred to the term model or paradigm. These terms tend to connote a mechanistic rigor, the establishment of definite relationships between or among variables to account for occurrences, which does not characterize the present level of achievement in the analysis of policy formulation or for that matter, the reality of policy formation.

THE FRAMEWORK

The framework I have chosen to work with was suggested by Dr. James M. Roherty in a Spring 1977 seminar at the University of South Carolina. It seems to incorporate the freedom of the descriptive model with the structure provided by the Horton model. By substituting structural/functional components of the policy-making process for the topical headings of the Horton model, the research freedom of the descriptive model is preserved while greatly increasing the comparative advantages.

Initially, Professor Roherty identified four structural/functional components to describe the national security policy formulation process:

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(1) 'The Community' (Identification of major participants in defense policy formation)

(2) 'The Channels' (The inter-active process of the major participants)

(3) 'Constraints' (which with the community compose the environment of the policy formulation process)

(4) 'The Functions' (defined as system outputs)

As a modification of this framework I propose to add a fifth component, the resource allocation process (budgeting). In the initial framework, Professor Roherty included the resource allocation process within the 'Constraints' component. However, because of the importance of the resource allocation process to the formulation and analysis of modern national security policy (which will be further discussed), it warrants consideration as a fifth component. Therefore, the comparative framework proposed by this paper consists of:

(1) 'The Community'

(2) 'The Channels'

(3) 'The Constraints'

(4) 'The Resource Allocation Process'

(5) 'The Functions'

Several underlying assumptions are implied by the composition of this framework. Of first importance, the framework implies that policy is an outcome of a formulation process. In this respect the framework conforms precisely with the previous definition of policy.

Secondly, the framework implies that the formulation

process is both political and bureaucratic in nature. The work of Max Weber[5], Samual Huntington[6], Gabriel Almond[7], David Easton[8], and numerous others is sufficient to substantiate this aspect of public policy-making. However, this is not to say that the framework assumes any particular form or style of government. It posits five areas for research which exhibit no normative bias in their statement. Rather, it is the purpose of research to discover the nature of each area in any given country.

The selection of these particular five components of the formulation process does assume that the framework has incorporated all the essential variables important in the formulation of national security policy. An examination of work previously done in constructing models of public policy-making will help to verify that this has been accomplished.

Thomas Dye's Model

This paper suggests that the comparative analysis of national security policy be studied in terms of the formulation of policies rather than exclusively in terms of the policies themselves. Therefore it is necessary to demonstrate that the components of the proposed comparative framework accurately reflect the policy formulation process. As an overview of the policy-making milieu, it is useful to consult a recent model constructed by Thomas Dye, an authority on the analysis of public policy-making. In a recent work

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Dye has developed a general diagram of linkages implicit in the conduct of policy analysis. (Figure 1-1)

FIGURE 1-1   Linkages in Policy Analysis

Environment   Political System   Public Policy

```
                  ┌──────────────┐
              ↗   │ Institutions,│   ↖
          A       │ Processes,   │       B
        ↙         │ Behaviors    │         ↘
              E   └──────────────┘   F
┌──────────────┐                        ┌──────────┐
│Environmental │──────── C ────────────▶│ Public   │
│Forces        │                        │ Policies │
│and           │◀─────── D ─────────────│          │
│Conditions    │                        └──────────┘
└──────────────┘
```

Dye, Thomas, Understanding Public Policy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 5.

Dye's model suggests that there are three major categories to consider in policy analysis; the environment, the political system, and public policy (an output which also provides policy input in the form of feedback). Although Dye's approach is systemic as opposed to structural functional, a close examination of figure 1-1 will indicate that the linkages necessary for policy analysis identified by Dye are also included in the proposed framework.

David Easton's Model

To more formally demonstrate the proposed framework's
link with the traditional literature in the study of public
policy, the use of a second model, of which the Dye model
is a derivative, will be useful. To visualize the relationship
of the five components of the proposed framework to each
other and to the process of policy formulation, it is useful
to return to the basic model used by David Easton to describe
the governmental decision-making operation. The basic model
demonstrates how decisions or policies are a function of the
inputs which are in turn affected by subsequent outputs.

Environment

Inputs ⟶ | Decision-making Apparatus | ⟶ Outputs

Feedback loop

Environment

Figure 1-2
Easton, David, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, (New
York: Wiley, 1965), p. 32.

By substituting Dye's three categories, environment,
political system, public policy, for Easton's inputs,
decision-making apparatus, outputs, the relationship between
the two is obvious. Both models specify identical linkages

inherent in the formulation of public policy and therefore
central also to the analysis of public policy.

Easton intended his structural approach to be a model
of political decision-making. The implication of the model
is that if one can identify all the inputs and fully
comprehend the decision-making process within the 'black
box', then one may predict policy. Although this rigor is
not claimed for the proposed comparative framework, by
superimposing the proposed variables on the basic Easton
model, their relationship to each other is clarified, and
the appropriateness of the components for the study of
national security policy is demonstrated.

Figure 1-3

(Inputs) ⟶ Formulation Process   (Outputs)

3. The Constraints   1.   The Community

a. Internal dimension   2.   The Channels   4. Functions
b. External dimension   (policies)
                          5.   Resource Allocation
1. The Community   5. Budgeting

Feedback loop

Using this construction as a heuristic model only, several points are demonstrated. The point of Dye's triangular model is highlighted. The linkages involved in the formulation of national security policy prevent the establishment of clear cut categories such as inputs and outputs. The nature of the process blurs these distinctions. The constraints and the community represent inputs to the formulation process and they compose the environment within which the process takes place. The community is also clearly part of the formulation process. The resource allocation process is a key part of the formulation process, but in its final form (the budget) represents an output of the formulation process. As a result of these linkages which act to blur the definition of functions, the term framework is more appropriate than model.

EXPLANATION OF THE FRAMEWORK

The thesis of this paper is that research oriented in terms of these five structural/descriptive components of the formulation process, the community, the channels, the constraints, the functions, and the resource allocation process, will facilitate the comparative study of national security policy. A thorough explanation of what is included in each component is necessary.

The Community

The defense community consists of all the participants,

individuals, interest groups, and sectors both public and
private, that are attentive to and which seek to influence
defense policy at any stage from inception to execution.

The initial step is the conduct of research necessary
to prepare a comprehensive list of all members of this
community within the designated state. Some examples other
than the likely governmental participants, chief of state,
legislative body, and defense ministry/department, are key
members of armaments industries, the existence of civilian
think-tank type operations concerned with national security
policy, or individual civilians who provide input on defense
policy issues. In addition to the identification of partici-
pants, an assessment should be made of the relative influence
of each within the community as a whole. Both the members
of a comprehensive defense community, and the relative
distribution of influence of each member within the community
will vary from country to country.

As was indicated the framework makes no assumption of
form of government. Research may reveal that a relatively
few or one major participant exercises the preponderance of
influence within the community. This situation has been
alleged in the case of Iran, where without doubt the Shah
holds primary influence. This does not mean that national
security policy flows directly from the Shah. A look below
the surface of governmental type will likely reveal more
than a community of one. In the case of Iran, there are a
number of influential families who have some influence as

well as a division of influence within the Shah's own
household. Although the assessment of influence is important,
the comprehensive identification of all the participants
is equally important for the purpose of comparative study.

A final factor to be considered is a discussion of the
tenor of civil-military relations within the community. It
is necessary to examine the balance between total civilian
influence and total military influence within the community.
What are the elements of civil control of the military if
in fact civil control exists?

The Channels

The term channels refers to the processes of interaction
existing among the members of the identified community. In
the development of this component, the goal of research is
to map the interactive processes through which defense
policy emerges and is executed. Implied by this concern for
the identification of the effective channels by which defense
policy is developed and conducted, is that there may be a
difference between the established channels and the exist-
ing pattern of inter-action of the participants. In short
one must be concerned with both formal structures and
organization patterns, and the possibility of the existence
of informal processes.

It is not sufficient to consider the official governmental
chart which describes organizational relations as representing
the 'important channels' within the community in the

consideration of national security policy. The existence
of such an official charting is useful for providing insight
and starting points, but informal patterns may be as
important or more important in the final determination of
policy. As an example, whereas by official organization a
national security policy committee may be charged with the
development and implimentation of national security policy,
the key decisions may be made by a select group within the
ruling cabinet. It is essential that the effective channels,
whether they are formal or informal, be identified.

The Constraints

'The Constraints' refers to the explication of the
salient forces bearing on defense policy formation. In
combination with the community, the constraints represent
the inputs to the formulation process. If it is true as is
concluded in the study done by Bauer, Pool, and Dexter,
American Business and Public Policy, that decision-making
is a social process imbedded in a stream of social processes,
then the constraints bearing on defense policy constitute
the stream.[9]

Examples of typical constraints which may be important
for policy formulation in any country are: strategic,
technological, resource (money or raw material), political,
and institution/organizational. As is evident from this
listing, there is more than one dimension to constraints on
national security policy processes. In his article "West

German Foreign and Defense Policy-An Analysis", Professor
Elmer Plischke distinguishes between the external dimension
and the internal dimension of constraints to security policy.[10]
As previously described, the process of security policy
formulation takes place within the confines of a nation-
state, however, it seeks to exert its influence largely
outside the nation-state. Although the formulation process
is internal, it is far from immune to the influence of
external forces.

Each of the sample constraints listed above have
potentially both internal and external dimensions. The best
example is political constraints. In formulating security
policy, what may be politically possible within the state,
perhaps even desireable, may be totally unacceptable because
of the political realities of the state's position in the
international system. It is through this external dimension
of constraints that the international system intrudes on
the formulation of national security policy.

The Functions

It is in this component that concern for system outputs
is reflected. 'The functions' are the significant policy
results presently issuing from the community possibly in the
field of but not limited to: strategy, personnel, procurement,
force structure, and doctrine. It is here that one is
concerned with particular policies, not in and of themselves,
but as they reflect the formulation process and as they serve

to illuminate trend lines of policy as outcomes of community functioning.

A major point in the analysis of policies as system outputs is the extent to which they are aggregative.[11] It is important to discover whether a policy is the result of a combination of interests or dictated by a power center (either one or multiple). It is necessary to discover whether policy outputs reflect the society, the political leadership, and if there is evidence that policies are a result of a pluralistic process which allows for give and take among recognized interest groups and institutional members. It is here that the importance of the identified functions lies rather than as policies in and of themselves.

The Resource Allocation Process

The final component in the comparative framework is the resource allocation process. It is clear that this component represents the type of linkage described above which tends to blur the distinction between system and output. Within the formulation process itself, the examination of the pattern of interaction among the members of the community concerning the allocation of resources deserves to be examined as a pattern distinct from others which may exist. This is due not so much to the fact that the interactive pattern of allocating scarce resources may be substantially different from other influence patterns, but to the signif- icance of the allocation process result, the budget, as an

output.

The resource allocation process can be viewed in essence as the operationalization of policy. A policy may be officially stated and therefore viewed as a function or output. However, going back to the definition of policy, some additional action is required to validate a policy. In this respect as Lawrence Korb has stated, "dollars are policy".[12]

In effect this component of the framework implies a method for testing the validity of policy. By comparing the output of the resource allocation process, the budget, with the identified 'functions' it is possible to gain some assessment of the validity of specific policies. For example a nation-state may announce a policy of willingness to wage a limited nuclear war at the tactical level. However, if the budget allocates money to the procurement of large ICBMs and none to the development and procurement of tactical nuclear weapons, then the policy is not operationalized.

The Modernization Bias

In the discussion of this framework with colleagues and observers, the criticism has been presented that the framework applies well to the modernized nations such as the U.S., Russia, France, Britain, etc., but that it is not useful in comparing the national security formulation processes of less developed countries (LDCs). This criticism

needs to be examined.

The genesis of this criticism is probably to be found in the preoccupation of some people with the 'channels' component. When researching this element for a country such as the U.S. one finds a multitude of actors, sophisticated patterns of relations steming from the specificity of bureaucracy, and highly developed organizations oriented to defense policy. within the civilian sector, one will find powerful and sophisticated policy analysis organizations which provide input to the formulation process. The framework does not specify that this level of development has to be present, only that these five variables exist and are important.

No matter what the modernization level of a nation-state, if it has national security policy concerns, a 'community' of some sort exists. The members of that community interact in some identifiable pattern. LDCs, perhaps more than other more modernized states, will have 'constraints' which impact on policy although they will probably be of a different type in comparison with those experienced in the modernized state. Finally, there will be some outputs of the system in the form of national security policy.

The essence of the argument running throughout this paper is that it would be impossible to have transnational comparison of national security policy unless a common framework is employed to structure the symmetry of the information developed.

SUMMARY

The framework which has been proposed is essentially descriptive-inductive in nature. It is intended not as a structural-functional model which relates variables in a specific fashion, but rather as a framework for research. The goal is to generate factual information in such a way that it is comparative across national boundaries. This does not rule out a certain degree of prescriptive possibility.

Descriptive models start from assumptions about how variables are related to each other in fact. A prescriptive model may draw heavily on descriptive models when there is an attempt to identify the strategic variables which could be manipulated to cause the desired result.[13] Thus it can be seen that prescription is heavily dependent upon adequate description.

Prescription in the sense that we can assemble all the variables involved in the formulation of national security policy and accurately specify the relationships which exist between and among these variables in such a way as to anticipate the policy result is not foreseen. It is foreseen that by the energetic development of the information specified by the proposed framework, it will be possible to predict which members of the community will be involved in the formulation process. From this it will be possible to predict the patterns of interaction which will develop as the policy is formulated. As the major constraints become known,

together with the above information it may become possible
to establish trend lines of policy outcomes although
probably not the specific policies.

FOOTNOTES

1   Lawrence Martin, The Management of Defence, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976).

2   Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, (Englewood-Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 1.

3   Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 171.

4   Ibid, pp. 186-187.

5   Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, (New York: The Free Press, 1949).

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12 Lawrence Korb, "The Budget Process in the Department of Defense, 1947-77: The Strengths and Weaknesses of Three Systems", in Public Administration Review, July/August 1977, p. 334.

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CHAPTER II

A CASE STUDY:

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY FORMULATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Having presented and developed a framework which will be useful in the guidance of research on the topic of national security policy formulation, a case study is offered of how national security policy is formulated in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) utilizing the framework. There are several reasons for conducting the case study. Primarily it is important to demonstrate how the framework can be employed to structure a design of the processes by which security policy is formulated in a situational setting.

Secondly, the use of a case study illuminates the point that the comparative value of the framework is derived from the framework and is not a working part of the framework. In other words there is no model which directly projects comparative analysis. The framework facilitates comparison by providing guidance for research efforts and assuring the symmetry of information presented. Comparison becomes a subsequent action in which the community of one nation-state can then be compared to the community of another. The ways in which the communities interact may be compared or contrasted as well as the varied constraints to which each community is subject. Finally, the system outputs may be compared as to how they relate to the composition of the

community and to the extent to which they are aggregative.

In the conclusion to this chapter, it will be seen that from the case study conducted within these parameters it becomes possible to set forth a number of general propositions about the processes of national security policy which can serve as baselines for comparative theory.

To facilitate the investigation of national security policy formulation in the FRG, I will follow the outline of the framework prefaced by a descriptive summary designed to provide basic information and to establish the environment in which national security policy is debated in the FRG.

Descriptive Summary

The German military forces, the Bundeswehr, came into being in 1956, as a result of a joint decision of the federal government and the federal parliament to provide for the rearmament of the FRG. The Bundeswehr encompasses 495,000 men of whom 345,000 are Army, 108,000 Airforce and 38,000 Navy. In addition to the Bundeswehr, there exists a 63,000 man Territorial Army which is under national command.[1]

The Army is commanded by three Corps Headquarters and organized into 33 brigades. The Bundeswehr emphasizes the brigade concept as a self-contained fighting unit capable of individual employment. There are 13 armored brigades, 12 mechanized infantry brigades, 3 fighter brigades, 2 mountain brigades, 3 airborne brigades, and one separate armored regiment.[2]

A reorganization program termed the Model 80 Concept is currently being pursued by the Bundeswehr to strengthen German forces to better meet the growing Warsaw Pact conventional threat.[3] The goal is to make the combat units, the battalions and brigades, more flexible on the battlefield. There will be more battalions in a brigade but they will be smaller battalions. This reorganization will increase the number of tanks in both armored and mechanized infantry brigades. There will also be a dramatic increase in the antitank weapons to 2500 ATGM systems.

The Territorial Army is under national command and has the mission of providing rear area security, traffic control, refugee movement, etc., within West Germany. The purpose is to free the Bundeswehr and other NATO forces to concentrate on combat missions without having to worry about rear area security.

The Bundeswehr is an 'alliance army'. It cannot accomplish its defense mission outside the NATO structure.[4] All forces of the Bundeswehr are directly under NATO operational command. These are the only forces in NATO subject to the direct command of SACEUR. U.S. forces in West Germany come first under the command of the Commander, USAEUR, and are indirectly commanded by SACEUR.

In time of peace the Forces, Territorial Army and Bundeswehr (administrative control only), are commanded by the Minister of Defense.[5] Upon promulgation of a 'state of defense' by the Bundestag, command of the armed forces passes

to the Federal Chancellor.[6] The Federal Chancellor is the individual directly charged with responsibility for the defense of the country.[7]

The FRG has a sort of volunteer/intensive conscription system, i.e. a mixed system based on the principle of universal public service. About 55% of the force are conscripts and 45% are professionals or career soldiers.[8] Conscripts serve for 15 months of active duty and a standby readiness term of 12 months. Any man liable to military service can be called up in peacetime for a total of 24 months of military service.[9]

In the FRG, conscientious objector status is institutionalized. Article 4, paragraph 3 of the Basic Law, the German constitution, provides that no one may be compelled to render war service involving the use of arms against his conscience.[10] Anyone who objects to military duty may perform alternate government service for a period of 18 months as a substitute.[11] It has been necessary to register as a conscientious objector and appear before a board to judge each case on an individual basis.

The trend is toward liberalizing the procedures for claiming objector status. According to Georg Leber, the Federal Defense Minister, "the examination procedure for conscientious objectors is to be discontinued for those not called upon to serve, simplified and speeded up for conscripts, enlisted men and reservists. No examinations of conscience will in the future be conducted".[12] The most

recent legislation approved by the Bundestag in 1977 no
longer requires anyone to claim objector status in order to
qualify for alternative service. The intention of the
legislation is to continue this 'freedom from military
service' as long as strength goals continue to be achieved.

Policy Formulation Analysis

Considering the model that has been chosen as a vehicle
for analysis, the logical order of investigation would appear
to be: (a) identification of the community, (b) examination
of the interactive processes of the participants in the
community, (c) investigation of systemic constraints to
policy-making, (d) the resource allocation process, and (e)
systemic outputs. The logic in this order of priority is
obvious and stems from the central nature of the 'community'
to the formulation process.

Participants in Policy Formulation-'The Community'

As a generalization, it can be said that there is no
'strategic community' in the West German population as we
might define the term. Important problems dealing with
security and defense policies are largely excluded from the
process of forming public opinion. That there is a clear
dearth of information available to the public is the view
of one German civilian scholar engaged in research of defense
policy.[13] Of course, in the sense that there exist arms
manufacturers, bureaucrats in the defense ministry, and

other industrialists and officials whose livelihood stems from defense related issues, there is a civilian community of sorts. However, they are concerned more with lobby efforts than with discussion of substantive issues.

In a special issue of the Adelphi Papers series, a listing is given of civilian research groups and 'think-tank' type operations which are currently functioning in West Germany. Many of these have the stated purpose of conducting research on issues of national security interest with the express goal of providing input to policy. A review of their sources of funding reveals that some are totally supported by the German government. However, there are a significant number which rely partially or totally on funding from nongovernmental sources.

The extent of the development of a military-industrial complex in West Germany is also a new subject of controversey. In his article "The Military-Industrial Complex in West Germany and the Consequences for Peace-Policy", Fritz Vilmar reaches several conclusions about the character of military-industrial relations in the FRG. As a result of economic slowdowns beginning in 1967-68, German industrialists are becoming increasingly desireous of defense contracts. As of yet armaments expenditures have not been used by the government to bolster domestic employment. Mr. Vilmar believes it is fair to state that the economic power elite in the FRG has not appeared as a protagonist of a high armament budget, and is not yet strong enough to force the

government to build unnecessary weapons. His overall assessment is that the size of the military-industrial complex in West Germany is growing.

The present trend in this aspect of the community is a movement away from an essentially closed access community to a more pluralistic structure.

It is frequently said by German officials that the FRG has no 'general staff' vested with operational command responsibility. It is reemphasized that in the event of war, the bulk of the combat forces will be placed under the control of NATO commanders. In reality, there does exist a national command structure although it does not resemble former German General Staff models nor is it equivalent to the American JCS system. At the apex of the military establishment is an armed forces staff headed by the inspector general of the armed forces. His is the highest military position in the defense establishment. The highest ranking position in each of the regular services-the inspectors of the army, navy, and air force-are also the chiefs of staff of the respective services. The following diagram (figure 2-1) explains the command structure.

National Command Structure[14]

Minister of Defense

Inspector General of
Bundeswehr

IG of   IG of   IG of
Army   Navy   Air Force

Figure 2-1

The Federal Minister of Defense is at the top of the peacetime command. Reporting directly to the Minister is the Inspector General of the Bundeswehr who is a general officer and who has an administrative staff. Subordinate to the IG of the Bundeswehr are the inspectors general of the three services who are also senior military officers who supervise administrative staffs. It is important to note that this arrangement is characteristically administrative in nature. The operational planning and war planning functions take place within the NATO framework.

The following participants comprise the primary policy formulation community.

```
Federal President-appoints all officers and NCOs
Federal Chancellor
Minister of Defense
Foreign Minister
Finance Minister
Cabinet
Bundestag-1.  Defense Committee
         2.  Defense Commissioner (ombudsman)
Federal Security Council (NSC equivalent)
Federal Intelligence Agency (CIA equivalent)
Federal Armed Forces Defense Council (JCS equivalent)
NATO Council
```

Interaction Processes of the Participants-'The Channels'

The diagram (2-2) on the following page provides some insight as to how the major participants interact during the decision-making process. There are some important observations to be made from observing this diagram. The arrangement is not hierarchical, that is information or input does not flow from top to bottom or bottom to top. The lines of

40

Figure 2-2

Extracted from "An Organizational Perspective on German National Security Policy" by Ernst W. Gohlert in *Comparative Defense Policy*, edited by Frank B. Horton, *et al*, P. 213.

communication make clear the emphasis placed on sharing of input and the opportunity for debate. A key point is that the Federal Intelligence Agency inputs to both the Federal Security Council, and the Bundestag Committees. This provides the legislative body with raw data upon which to make a truly independent assessment.

The planning of the overall defense and its implement-ation are coordinated by a special cabinet committee, the Federal Security Council, presided over by the Federal Chancellor.[15] The Federal Security Council is officially charged with making national security policy. In reality, policy tends to be debated here and as it stands now, policy is formally decided within the cabinet.[16] The chief actors in the formal decision-making stage are the Federal Chancellor, the Minister of Defense, and the Minister of Finance.[17]

Concerning the interaction of military and civilians in this policy procedure, the military impacts on the policy process through two primary organizational tools. The Minister of Defense provides direct input for the military to the cabinet.[18] The Federal Armed Forces Defense Council provides direct representation to the military through its affiliation with the Federal Security Council. There is the feeling that times are changing in West Germany. The military is no longer kept at arms length as before.[19] Civilian control is assured by the civilian Minister of Defense and the central role of the Federal Chancellor. The

principle that the Minister of Defense is a civilian is so
firmly established that a departure from it would probably
be considered of great significance. The Bundeswehr has
been under undisputed civilian control. There is no
military lobby associated with the parliament, and there
have been very few instances where military spokesmen have
attempted publicly or by personal contact to influence
parliamentary action. However, there is a perception that
the military is increasing its influence in the policy-
making process.[20]

Under the constitution, the Bundestag has been assigned
special rights of control over the Bundeswehr.[21] These rights
are observed by the Defense Committee and by the Bundestag's
Defense Commissioner (ombudsman). The Defense Committee
possesses the rights of a committee of investigation. As
an organ exercising parliamentary control, the Defense
Commissioner of the German Bundestag watches over the
constitutional rights of the serving citizen subject to the
special conditions of the army. The Bundestag has the power
to legislate on defense expenditure and on the numerical
strength and the general organizational structure of the
armed forces.[22]

'The Constraints'

In his study of post-war FRG foreign policy, The SPD
and European Integration, Professor William E. Paterson
states, "West Germany has served as the primary model of the

'penetrated political system', a system in which the major
political decisions affecting the future of that society
are taken primarily by the leaders of other states."[23] It
will become obvious from this paper that in the post-war era,
West German national security policy formulation has exhibited
a 'system under constraints' to a degree greater than any
other with the exception of Japan.

In their order of importance, there are five categories
of constraints which impact on the policy formulation process
in the FRG: institutional, social, strategic, technological,
and economic.

Institutional Constraints

There are three primary institutional constraints which
have a direct influence on the security policy formulation
process. These are: the Basic Law (the constitution of the
FRG), the Western European Union (WEU), and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO).

According to Article 87a of the Basic Law, the sole
task assigned to the Federal Armed Forces is defense.[24]
In conformity with the United Nations Charter, the Basic
Law provides that the FRG may accede to a system of military
collective security to insure the preservation of peace.[25]
This has resulted in the creation of several unique features
which characterize the Federal Forces. Each of the armed
forces has been assigned very specific missions. The
assignment of such specific missions by the civilian

authorities lend clarity to what is expected of the military and defines what the services should prepare to accomplish. For example, "the Army must be able to defend the frontiers of the FRG and to protect the rest of the Federal territory against enemy invasion".[26]

Such a definition of mission has also led to significant structural constraints. Logistical assets of the combat forces have been tailored to the extent that support of the combat forces can be provided only within the territory of the FRG.[27] Additionally, as a consequence of Article 87a, it would be illegal for the West German government to deploy German military forces outside the FRG, not as members of a collective security force.

Article 26(2) of the Basic Law places restraints on the manufacture of weapons, and Article 26 (1) makes the waging of aggressive war illegal.[28] The impact of this constitutional constraint on weapons production is not obvious but nevertheless significant. In the FRG, it is illegal for a civilian firm to manufacture weapons without the knowledge and consent of the Federal government. Although this restriction has not prevented the rise of a large, modern, and sophisticated arms industry in West Germany, it has insured that the government is knowledgeable about and in a position to control the production of armaments. Of critical importance, is the fact that the seductive feature of armaments in being has been controlled to a significant degree. It is not possible for a major aircraft company to

develop a system independently and confront the decision-makers with the wide range of capabilities the machine can accomplish with the intent to seduce the policy maker to approve the adoption of the system.

Article 45a (2) of the Basic Law grants investigative powers to the Committee of Defense of the Bundestag.[29] The Bundestag debates defense policy and monitors morale and conditions of service. It is in the parliamentary arena that the parties in opposition to the government gain access to defense information and details that are not made public.

Article 65 (a) invests power of command of the armed forces in the Minister of Defense in peacetime.[30] It is obvious that the constitution of the FRG operates as a significant constraint to national security policy formulation through the embedding of key principles and structural features in the rule of law.

Western European Union (WEU)

In 1954, by the Brussels Treaty, the FRG renounced the production of atomic, biological, or chemical weapons and agreed to international control of their armed forces.[31] In a WEU Resolution of 9 May 1957, the Bundeswehr was given weapons which have both conventional and nuclear capability. The authority of disposal over the nuclear weapons lies solely in the hands of the United States.[32]

The WEU also determines the stock levels of major weapons and ammunition that may be accumulated in the Bundeswehr and

makes inspections periodically to ensure that the levels
are not exceeded.[33]

NATO

As a result of treaty agreement and as a pre-condition
for German rearmament, in the event of emergency the entire
Bundeswehr comes directly under NATO command.[34]   As a result
of the depth of German commitment to NATO, such specifics as
force deployment and operational command are dictated by
NATO command rather than as the result of national decision
making.   Such a constraint is atypical from the standpoint
of what is normally considered to be a right of national
command.   These restrictions can become critical as in the
case of the German campaign for a 'forward defense' strategy
in NATO.   Whereas Germany was convinced of the necessity of
maintaining major defenses East of the Rhine River, the
German government was forced to lobby the other members of
NATO in order to obtain this policy in the face of significant
allied interest in using the Rhine as a defensive barrier in
the primary defense of Western Europe.

Social Constraints

It can fairly be said that the Bundeswehr is an army
which has been denied a history.   Within Germany it is
commonly held that the history of the Bundeswehr dates only
from its formation in 1956.   For perhaps obvious reasons,
there is a desire not to find the roots of the modern German

military in the legacy of German military history. An
outstanding example of this denial of a history is the
reaction of the Federal government in the Rudel case which
represented a small scandal in the West German military in
the Fall of 1976. Rudel had been an ace in the WW II
Luftwaffe and had been closely associated with Adolf Hitler
more for his military competence than for his political
views. When the active duty squadron of which Rudel had
been a part in WW II invited Herr Rudel as an honored guest
to a reunion, the leadership of the Federal government
objected. When two active duty generals supported the
attendance of Rudel, they were relieved. In this case, Herr
Leber, the Minister of Defense, stated that the people of
Germany consider the twenty years of peace since the
foundation of the Bundeswehr to be its historical legacy.

As pointed out in an important study by Dr. Wolfgang
R. Vogt, "Armed Forces in a Peace-Seeking Society: Bundeswehr
in a Conflict Between Internal Reform and External Detente",
the political, social, and economic conditions of a society
are determining factors for the military organization. At
the time this study was conducted, 1973, a projection of the
social changes in the situation of the Bundeswehr clearly
showed that the armed forces were being subjected more and
more to the pressure of internal reform policy and the external
policy of detente. Based on opinion survey sampling conducted
in 1971 and 1972, it was possible to detect a less positive
attitude of the population toward military service. Only a

minority of the population perceived a military threat.
Dr. Vogt's conclusion was that these social circumstances
were leading to an identity crisis for the Bundeswehr.[35]
The denial of a military history could only aggravate this
identity crisis.

It is a key in understanding this social perception
identified by Dr. Vogt to remember that these opinion samp-
lings were made at a time which corresponded exactly to the
time when the major achievements of the Federal foreign
policy of Ost-Politik were being realized. In the early
enthusiasm over the presumed accomplishments of Ost-Politik,
there was a perception of greatly decreased military threat.

It is possible now to observe that the Bundeswehr has
passed through an identity crisis exacerbated by these
societal perceptions. The recent Federal White Paper for
1975/1976, devoted considerable attention to analysis of
updated research data which show that these adverse trends in
public perception have now been reversed.[36]

However, the crisis has left its legacy in the Bundeswehr.
The emphasis is on civilianizing military duties and heavy
investment in technical education which has civilian
application.

Another important social constraint is the social unrest
which has come as a result of the 'technetronic age'. In
Crisis in European Defence, Geoffrey Lee Williams maintains
that in the context of making of defense policy, the subject
of urban guerrilla warfare cannot be ignored any longer.[37]

He believes that the constraints on defense policy for all
the nations of Western Europe will be considerable.[38] One
only has to consider the impact of the Bader-Meinhof gang
to highlight the meaning of this form of social constraint
for the FRG.

Strategic Constraints

Ost-Politik

Although considered by many to have reached at least a
temporary impass, rapprochment with Eastern Europe is still
a key element of foreign policy of the FRG. Defense policy
is seen as complementing the eastern strategy of normalizing
political relations with the Communist neighbors.[39] It has
been obvious that the Federal government has viewed a strong
defense alliance with the West as a key to dealing with the
East. To a significant degree, future defense policy will be
influenced by developments in relations with the East.

Nuclear Weapons

By both desire and design, the FRG is compelled to rely
on the American strategic deterrent. To make this nuclear
deterrent credible, they are forced to avidly support large
scale U.S. troop deployments in West Germany. The existence
of these troops impact to a very great degree on FRG
decision-making calculations. It has been hypothesized by
many uninformed observers that if America were to substantially
reduce this foreign troop deployment in the FRG the German

government would be encouraged to increase the level of their own forces to compensate. Such an assessment is fallacious from at least two standpoints. As regards nuclear weapons, such a substantial reduction in American presence would bring into real doubt the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee.

Of more importance, if American military forces should be reduced, the Federal government would come under sharp pressure to decrease the size of its conventional forces in NATO and reduce defense expenditures generally.[40] In the words of Defense Minister Leber, "if left to fend for itself, the FRG would not be capable of defending itself successfully against military attack nor of developing a credible deterrent against possible aggression".[41]

Technological Constraints

West German industrial development has advanced to the point where any desired system can be produced if the government chooses to allocate the resources. However, the increasing costs of advanced technology-improved tanks, aircraft, and missiles-have made it clear to German officials that if some division of labor is not achieved, it will be necessary to forego more and more military capabilities which they could previously afford.[42] The Federal government is dedicated to joint technological development and a staunch supporter of 'standardization'.[43] In addition, the government has announced that it is willing to take temporary

set-backs in national production to foster standardization and cost savings.[44]

Economic Constraints

Against the background of the postwar German economic miracle which has placed the West German economy on a level with the strongest economies in the world, it must sound strange to speak of economic constraints having an influence on national security policy formulation. It is a fact that the economy is of such strength that limiting of defense spending is truly a matter of political allocation of resources and not as the result of a failure of the economy.

And yet, there are restraints on spending for defense projects. West Germany characterizes herself as a 'social welfare democracy'. Competition for monetary resources to increase social services is strong and backed by the bulk of the society.[45] Once again as Minister Leber observes, "due to the multitude of other domestic needs and the rising demands made by the citizen on the state, moneys used for defense are felt to be more objectionable than in the past. The defense budget is therefore a popular butt of criticism".[46]

In addition, there are some elements which still fear the existence of a large military establishment which might tend to militarize society. The prospect of a 'resurgent Germany' is not favored by a substantial number of Germans as by other Europeans. West Germany still worries about her image.[47]

The Resource Allocation Process (Budgeting)

Defense spending as a percentage of GNP has steadily risen since 1970. In 1976, defense spending accounted for 4.7% of GNP.[48] Defense spending as a percentage of the total federal budget has decreased. From 1970 until 1975, defense spending remained steady at around 22% of the federal budget. In 1975, it fell to 19.2% and in 1976, 18.9%.[49] Chiefly as a result of the booming national economy, the German government has been able to increase defense expenditures while still choosing to allocate less of a percentage of the total federal budget to defense.

By far the largest portion of capital expenditure goes for military equipment and military research, development, and testing.[50] The presence of allied armed forces on FRG territory presents the FRG with additional defense burdens. This is acquired both through costs of property and quarters provided to foreign troops and payments made by the FRG to off-set balance of payments deficits of the U.S. and Britain as a result of stationing of troops in Germany.

In 1975, the FRG spent more on common defense than any other NATO nation except the U.S., both in absolute terms and per head of population. The 1976 expenditure was up 2.6% over 1975. Chancellor Schmidt is known to believe that reducing U.S. commitments to NATO would lead to reduced defense spending by his government. He has publicly ruled out greater German efforts to make up the difference because

lack of money, manpower and popular support would preclude such a solution.[51]

The actual procedures engaged in by the major participants in the defense community which result in the allocation of defense resources provides a valuable insight into the democratic processes which are operational in the FRG. The process is initiated when the Defense Minister provides guidance to the budget planning group within the Ministry of Defense.[52] This guidance concerns the desires of the Defense Minister and outlines the realistic amounts which the budget planning group can consider. The budget planning group, based on this guidance and with input provided by the services, prepares a rough budget which is then laterally coordinated with a similar planning group in the Ministry of Finance. Once a rough budget is laterally coordinated and all but major decisions resolved, the Minister of Defense introduces the budget to the cabinet. It is within the cabinet, under the guidance of the Federal Chancellor, that the hard issues are decided and the cabinet as a whole makes the final budgetary allocations.[53]

The Major Systemic Outputs-'The Functions'

In the case of the FRG the consistency demonstrated by all elements of the community, both in public statements by individuals and in government publications such as the annual defense white paper and the Facts on Germany publication, leaves little doubt that there is widespread consensus

within the community concerning major policy objectives which
are then translated into system outputs. The supreme goal
of the FRG's security policy is to protect the freedom and
the independence of the Federal Republic of Germany from
military threats and from political pressure and to safeguard
peace.[54] Hardly any other state has armed its forces so
obviously and exclusively purely for defense.

In an article published in NATO Review in 1976, Georg
Leber outlined the five principles underlying German defense
policy.[55] In his order of priority they are:

      (1) Alliance oriented
      (2) Bundeswehr defensive only
      (3) Forward defense
      (4) Totality of deterrence-conventional, tactical
            nuclear, strategic nuclear. (flexible response)
      (5) Standardization

These five principles can be viewed as a concise
statement of the major outputs of the FRG national security
policy formulation process. It is easy to see how the major
constraints of the environment have had significant effect
on these outputs. The defensive characterization and the
alliance structure are direct results of the pattern of
constraints.

These major system outputs are also aggregative in nature.
They reflect the result of political give and take among the
major participants in the community. A survey of important
security policies over the years shows that even with a major
change of political leadership from the dominant CDU/CSU
coalition to the present SPD coalition, the central character

of West German security policy has remained amazingly stable.[56]

SUMMARY

As can be implied from the discussion of constraints which shape the national security policy formulation process in West Germany, the system serves as an example of one molded by constraints. And yet, as evidenced by the approach to interaction which exists in the structural procedures for deciding policy and the democratic give and take involved in the resource allocation process, the FRG serves also as a model which recognizes plurality of interests in decision making.

Based on this case study, a number of normative statements necessary for comparison are possible. The community which participates in forming security policy in the FRG is open. There are regular actors but there is access for new participants. The civilian community is growing more interested in security policy and is seeking a greater input role. The patterns of interaction are dominated by the civilian political leadership. Military input is routinized but secondary. There is reason to believe that the civilians are becoming more willing to consult the military.

West Germany is seriously constrained in the formulation of her national security policy, but the future will serve to loosen some of these constraints. The trend in foreign policy is toward a less constrained environment for the FRG. This should serve to loosen some of the external constraints.

As the military-industrial complex matures in the FRG, this may lead to some internal loosening as well. Guided by its constraining influences, the system appears to have evolved into a positive example of how national security policy can be effectively formulated in a democracy.

FOOTNOTES

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CHAPTER III

DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Discussion and Conclusions

In chapter one of this paper a proposed framework specifically designed to facilitate the comparative study of national security policy was presented. Two general beliefs underlay the decision to investigate this topic and the manner of approach used. The first of these concerns the nature of the existing literature dealing with the comparison of security policy. This literature overwhelmingly tends to be concerned with policy as opposed to the processes and procedures of the formulation of policy. As a result, there is no single study which was truly comparative in the sense that the author employed any type of research design to structure research, comparison, and findings. By and large the writing in the area of security policy exhibits a high degree of fragmentation which characterizes the field of international relations in general.

Secondly, if the field of international relations is to make progress beyond its present level of achievement, effort must be applied to build on past research. In many respects those writing in the field are still engaged in periodically re-inventing the wheel. If used at all, past research is largely viewed as a new departure point,

or as a new aspect of the same problem to be pursued from a different angle. The effort must be made to promote the cumulative nature of international relations research.

In this respect one can draw heavily on the study of domestic policy-making to demonstrate a framework tailored to the study of national security policy. In the work of Thomas Dye and David Easton, the nature of public policy-making has largely been clarified. By developing the major variables which are central to the stud of national security policy, and considering them in the light of these classical models, the inter-relationships of the variables are seen to be the same as those specified by the domestic policy models.

Chapter two is a case study within this framework. A conclusion to be drawn from the use of the framework to conduct the case study is that not only would the proposed framework have a major impact on facilitating the acquisition of existing research and information, it would also improve the quality of that research. First, because scholars would be forced to depend on the five elements of the framework, they would become more fully aware of the exact purpose of their study. The framework is intended to be self-applied and therefore it is not overly specific in the basic construction. It is intentionally simplified so that its range of application can encompass all nation-states, and so the maximum freedom of discovery is preserved to prevent the pre-determination of outcome. In this sense, it

could be seen as providing a checklist for the scholar to align his work in the general pattern of existing works and would contribute to better organization of research in the field.

A second benefit to be derived from using the proposed framework is that competing hypotheses would be less difficult to identify and compare. Literature searches and literature reviews could acquire information about the status of various theoretical propositions more easily. Third, and closely related to the second point, scholars in one policy field could find out if scholars in other policy fields have discovered new relationships such as between environment and policy. Since much domestic policy research already uses the concepts and linkages inherent in this framework, theoretical findings in one domain could be applied to the study of security policy and vice versa.

A major conclusion which becomes evident from the nature of the proposed framework and the case study of policy formulation in the FRG is the dependence of the entire procedure on the detailed examination of the 'defense community'. In many respects the other four variables are dependent on a reasonable degree of success in the identification of at least the major participants in the security policy formulation process. Without such knowledge it certainly would be impossible to map the patterns of interaction necessary to describe the existing processes of formulation.

It is here that a potential problem with the framework
exists and therefore a valid criticism. In the transnational
examination of national security policy, one may encounter
political systems so closed that meaningful determination of
the major actors in security policy issues is prevented. An
example of such a case is that of China (PRC). In the PRC
the closed nature of the society in general is reflected in
the area of national security policy. It is frequently
impossible to determine the identity of members of routine
government agencies not to mention those responsible for
determining security policy.

Under such conditions the proposed framework is not
likely to facilitate significant insights into the formulation
process. In many cases the determination of existing outputs
or policies of such a system is a subject for intelligence
operations rather than traditional research efforts.
However, when such a system is encountered, no other paradigm
based on research would prove of greater success. The
'defense community' is so much at the center of any
comparative design that it seems to serve as a general
limiting feature.

Because the concept of 'defense community' is so basic
to the process of security policy analysis, some consideration
should be given to how one might go about identifying those
select actors in a much larger pool of policy oriented
participants who provide input to the formulation of national
security policy. As mentioned above the framework has been

simplified and rationalized for a number of reasons. No attempt has been made to provide a comprehensive list of participants in defense related actions, nor has an ideal-type community been provided. But it is less than comprehensive to stress the central nature of the defense community without providing some clue as to how one might go about identifying the requisite key actors. There are at least two approaches which can be used: policy tracing and structural analysis.

The use of policy tracing involves the selection of a system output, preferably a controversial policy, and the methical tracing of the policy backwards through the formulation process to identify which actors provided input. All members of the defense community do not become involved on every policy issue. Therefore, it is highly likely that some important actors will not be identified using this procedure. This is especially true if the policy selected for tracing happened to have been lightly debated. One way to reduce the magnitude of these problems is to select a number of policies covering a spectrum of system involvement for tracing. In this way some feel for the relative degree of influence of the various actors may also be gained.

In the structural analysis method, the level of analysis becomes the departments, agencies, and bureaus specifically identified as having responsibility for security policy formulation. Here the concern many times becomes which individual within the structural element actually provides

the department's input. The broader question which must be considered is which structures are actually involved in policy-making. Great care is necessary in this method to insure that the designation of structures as inputs to security policy does not become the sole criteria for analysis. In many cases the officially designated structures may not be exercising the influence indicated. Another danger is that there will be a tendency to exclude extra-structural actors from consideration.

Researcher vs Policy Maker

Finally, it is conceivable that this proposed framework can be employed in such a way as to have relevance for the policy-maker. As previously pointed out, there is considerable reason to believe that policy-makers in general do not anticipate assistance in performing their task from the field of international relations theory. The fact that some of the key scholars doing international relations research have acknowledged this fact and denied that their work needs to have any relevance to the policy-maker has served to widen the gulf.

By and large their goals are different. The scholars are looking for patterns which might some day provide definitive answers. The policy-makers are operators charged with the constant necessity to define their situation, identify goals and examine and choose among alternatives. I believe that the framework I have outlined will help any

potential or real political actor in performing these
classic steps of defining their situation, identifying goals,
and exploring as well as selecting alternatives. To illustrate
the utility of the framework, I will use an example based
on the question of arms sales to foreign governments.

Figure 3-1 indicates the kinds of questions suggested
by the framework for each of the three classic rational
decision-making steps.

Figure 3-1 Policy-Making Matrix

	Environment (The community & the constraints)	The Channels	The Functions (Policy)
Defining the Conditions	What are the conditions with respect to the sale of arms to foreign states? Who are the actors for and against the sale? What is the nature of the constraints to sale?	Who are the major actors and what are their capabilities and relationships?	What are the existing policies of critical actors?
Identifying Goals	What conditions should exist with respect to the sale of arms to foreign states? How are our overall security goals aided or retarded by the sales?	What changes might occur in the major actor's relationship in the policy process?	What policies do I want those critical actors to have?
Selecting Alternatives	What are the possible consequences of specific policies?	How could changes in actor's relationships change policies?	What policies would create the preferred conditions?

The questions that have been generated by the framework and that appear in figure 3-1 clearly indicate the need to consult different expertise. In the area of arms sales to foreign governments, for example, questions about the economics involved would best be answered by economists if they impact on defining the situation or selecting alternatives. Questions about the existing and likely predispositions of the actors and their likely policy outputs might be handled by political experts in such operational positions as journalist, intelligence analyst or international business official. As far as identifying goals is concerned, the source of the identification should be those individuals within a group or institution who know and represent the values of that group or institution.

Because the framework brings a certain degree of formalization to the policy-making process, it can be used to identify basic questions which are policy relevant. Such guidelines are important especially for large organizations where specialized intensive studies could provide a critical part of the picture. For example, models of the relationship between arms sales and regional warfare could be developed so that the effect of a particular increase in arms sales could be projected. This would be a small part of the entire picture the policy-maker has to take into account. However, the information generated by the model as well as the decision to devote resources to construct the model in the first place could be made more quickly if

a general framework were used in approaching the question.

The policy-maker could benefit substantially from a framework such as the one provided because of its integrative value. The framework could serve as a guideline for asking questions and piecing together necessary information. The systematic approach to dealing with policy questions can serve in planning the policy-making process so that it is not dominated by one discipline or one spokesman. It creates a built-in structure that allows the policy-maker to obtain and handle the information necessary for intelligent decision-making.

Recommendations for Further Research

As has been pointed out, this framework is heavily descriptive in nature. The elements of the framework are basically deduced from the established models of public decision-making. As a result, there is no assurance that other variables may not be acting on the process nor is there a great deal of predictive value as far as specific policies are concerned.

It would be interesting to see if future research, by using this framework as a departure, might inductively develop a more rigorous model of the national security policy formulation process.

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